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I. INTRODUCTION: GREAT LAKES DIVERSION THREATS DIVERTED FROM
THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION

The 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty (Treaty)! is a model of
international water resources cooperation because it provides a
permanent dispute mechanism, the six member International Joint
Commission (UC). 2 Thus, both Canada and the United States have much
t Distinguished Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. AB., 1962,
Stanford University; LL.B., 1965, Stanford University. Honorary Professor of Law,
University of Dundee UNESCO Centre for Water Law, Science, and Policy. The author
discloses that he was a consultant to the International Joint Commission (IJC) in 19992000 during the preparation of Protection of the Waters of the Great Lakes, discussed in
this Article. The views expressed in this Article are solely the author's and do not reflect
the views of the Canadian or United States Commissioners and staff past and present. I
would like to thank Professor Noah Hall, Wayne State University School of Law, and
United States IJC Commissioner Sam Speck, for their helpful comments and insights.
1. Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters
Between the United States and Canada, U.S.-U.K., Jan. 11, 1909, 36 STAT. 2448
[hereinafter Treaty].
2. See David Lernarquand, The International Joint Commission and Changing
Canada-United States Boundary Relations, 33 NAT. REs. J. 59, 62-67 (1993) (providing a
brief history of the background of the Treaty). For a more detailed histories, see L.M.
BWOMFIELD & GERALD F. FITZGERALD, BOUNDARY WATERS PROBLEMS OF CANADA AND
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to celebrate on the lOOth anniversary of the Treaty. However, the most
interesting aspect of the Treaty is the regime's ability to evolve through
state practice beyond its original dispute resolution function, despite the
inconsistent support for UC involvement in transboundary water issues
of the United States. The Treaty has been severely criticized by
governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), especially in
Canada, for its limitations. 3 Taking the Great Lakes alone, the area is too
large and the resource management issues too complex to permit a single
governance regime. 4 Nonetheless, the UC has been able to use the
reference process to adapt "the spirit of the Treaty" to the new resource
challenges, primarily environmental, that the Great Lakes face. 5 This
Article offers an example of the power of the UC to overcome the
Treaty's limitations by using its status as an international body to
constructively influence the development of a new and important Great
Lakes management regime outside of the Treaty framework.
Between 2001 and 2005, the eight Great Lakes states negotiated an
innovative interstate compact, The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River
Basin Compact (Compact). 6 By 2008, all eight basin states had adopted
the necessary legislation and secured the constitutionally necessary joint
congressional consent. 7 In brief, the Compact makes it very difficult to

THE UNITED STATES (1958); A.D.P. HEENEY, ALONG THE COMMON FRONTIER: THE
INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION (1967); William R. Wilbughby, Expectations and
Experience 1909-1979, in R. SPENCER, J. KlRTON & K.R. NOSSAL, THE INTERNATIONAL
JOINT COMMISSION SEVENTY YEARS ON (1981).
3. See, e.g., David AIlee, Subnational Governance and the International Joint

Commission: Local Management of United States and Canadian Boundary Waters, 33
NAT. REs. J. 133 (1993) (arguing that the IJC is only used to help legitimize a political
solution to a conflict.). See also Robert V. Wright, The Boundary Waters Treaty: A

Proposed Public Submission Process to Increase Public Participation, Accountability,
andAccess to Justice, 54 WAYNEL. REv. 1609 (2008); Lee Botts & Paul Muldoon, Using
the Boundary Waters Treaty for the 21st Century: Revitalizing the Great Lakes
Governance Regime, 54 WAYNE L. REv. 1553 (2008).
4. See generally id.
5. See generally id.
6. See Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, available
at http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/docs/12-13-05/Great_Lakes-St_Lawrence_River_Basin_ Water_Resources_Compact.pdf(last visited Apr. 6,2009); see also Noah D. Hall,
Toward A New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water Management in the Great Lakes
Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REv. 405 (2006) (analyzing the innovative aspects of the
Compact).
7. Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 110-342, 122 Stat.
3739 (2008) [hereinafter Compact]. The Compact was proceeded by a soft law interstate
agreement, the Great Lakes Charter. See Peter V. McAvoy, The Great Lakes Charter:
Toward a Basinwide Strategy for Managing the Great Lakes, 18 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L.
L. 49, 50 (1986) (summarizing "the development of the Charter and attempts to

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1726142
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divert water outside the Great Lakes Basin. 8 Even small communities
that straddle the divide between the Great Lakes and other drainages,
which often includes a small part of a state, must meet a high standard to
gain access to water located only a few miles away. 9 Similar antidiversion prohibitions exist in Canada. In 2002, for example, Canada
enacted a strong federal anti-diversion law. 10
The Compact is a reaction to several proposed or possible projects to
divert the Lakes' water to the more arid regions of the United States or
undisclosed water-short countries. 11 In reality, the threatened plans or
bulk transfers were .either economically or politically infeasible or
involved trivial amounts of water. 12 Nonetheless, they touched raw
political nerves in both countries. In the United States, Congress has the
plenary power to allocate the Lakes, and the eight basin states worried
that they would progressively lose political power as the country's
population continued to tilt to the sun. 13 The possibility of
Congressionally mandated transfers to bail out Phoenix or other areas
helped spur approval of the Compact. 14
In Canada, nationalist Greens raised the specter of the loss of
Canadian sovereignty over its abundant water resources, but even more
dispassionate and knowledgeable experts argued that Canada had no
surplus waters to bail out the United States' profligate use of its waters. 15
characterize the role that the Charter is playing and will play in stimulating and guiding
the evolution of a regional water management framework").
8. Compact, supra note 7, § 4.8.
9. See generally Compact, supra note 7.
10. International Boundary Waters Treaty Act, R.S., Ch. 1-20 (2002).
11. In the late 1970s, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers released a Congressionally
mandated study on ways to recharge the depleted Ogallala Aquifer from adjacent areas.
See, e.g., PETER ANNIN, THE GREAT LAKES WATER WARS, 68.(2006). The study did not
include any proposal to construct a pipeline from Lake Superior to the High Plains, but it
triggered regional fears that the water-short West would eventually ask Congress to bail it
out with Great Lakes water. See generally id. The fears were reinforced by the 1982
Supreme Court decision, Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982), discussed, infra
footnotes 62-71, which held that groundwater still in the ground was an article of
commerce and thus subject to the Dormant Commerce Clause; see also ANNIN, supra, at
57-81. (discussing reactions to feared diversions and Sporhase); Great Lakes Legal
Seminar: Diversion and Consumptive Use, 18 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L. L. 1 (1986)
(providing a good snapshot of the diversion fears and range oflegal responses in the mid1980s).
12. ANNIN, supra note 11, at 194 (discussing one empty bulk freighter).
13. See, e.g., Communities Take Action to Protect Great Lakes, National Public
Radio, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=90517072&ft=1&f=1007 (last visited Apr. 6,2009).

14.Id.
15. Two respected Canadian academics criticized the Annex 2001 process, which led
to the Compact, as an abdication of the Canadian federal government's responsibility
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This argument drew on the long frustration caused by the population and
economic imbalance between the two countries and the long history of
perceived subordination of Canadian interests to its major trading
partner. 16
This Article does not address the merits of the Compact. Its focus is
on the paradox that an international water management regime, which
deals with the core of the Treaty and the use of the Great Lakes, was
negotiated outside the regime. One might expect that the IJC would lead
an investigation of the issue and recommend either amendments to the
Treaty or parallel federal legislation in Canada and the United States. In
fact, the Compact superimposed yet another new regulatory regime over
the Treaty regime. 17 The only attempt to harmonize the two regimes is
found in section 8.2, which was added toward the end of the process. 18
section 8.2 makes the Treaty regime superior and provides in part that
[n]othing in this Compact is intended to infringe nor shall any
term hereof be construed to infringe upon the treaty power of the
United States of America, nor shall be construed to alter or
amend any treaty or term thereof that has been or may hereafter
be executed by the United States of America .... Nothing in this
Compact is intended to affect nor shall be construed to affect the
application of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 whose
requirements continue to apply in addition to the requirements of
this Compact. 19
There are good reasons for the bypass. First, there was no boundary
waters dispute for the IJC to adjudicate. The diversion threats were just
that, and remote as well. Ironically, at Canada's insistence, the IJC was
given limited adjudicatory powers. 20 The Treaty only applies to
diversions or obstructions that affect the natural level of the lakes. 21 In
addition, the use of IJC to adjudicate environmental controversies has not
because it "would leave the provinces with no control over diversions in the U.S. [andJ
[iJt would also give the U.S. significant say over water-related developments in Canada."
D. W. Schlinder & Adele M. Hurley, Notes for Remarks to the Centre for Global Studies
Conference on CanadalU.S. Relations University of Victoria (Nov. 2004), in Rising
Tensions: Canada/U.S. Cross-Border Water Issues in the 21st Century, at I I, available
at http://www.powi.ca/pdfs/watersecurity/uvic_finalnotesJemarks.pdf (last visited June
9,2009).
16. Id.
17. See generally Compact, supra note 7.
18. Compact, supra note 7, § 8.2.
19. Id.
20. HEENEY, supra note 2.
21. Treaty, supra note 1, art. 3.
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been met with success. 22 The IJC asserted the power to determine its
jurisdiction absent a request to adjudicate or a reference from the two
countries. 23 This heresy was quickly rejected and adjudication is no
longer requested by the two governments. 24 Second, Articles II and III of
the Treaty impose a high burden of proof on any assertion of IJC
jurisdiction. 25 The victim country must prove either injury or a lowered
lake level. 26 Third, the status of Lake Michigan, which forms no part of
the Canada-United States boundary,27 as a boundary water, remains
unsettled. 28 Fourth, the longer a treaty stands, the harder it is to amend it.
22. The Trail Smelter dispute was originally referred to the IJC, but the United States
rejected the recommended award and the dispute was eventually resolved by a special
arbitral tribunal. See Michael J. Robinson-Dore, The Trial Smelter, Is What's Past
Prologue? EPA Blazes a New Trial for CERCLA, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 233, 249-51
(2006). In discussing a United States CERCLA action against the present owners of the
smelter, Professor Robinson-Dom noted that "[t]he Boundary Waters Treaty contains no
provision preempting the application of domestic law." Id. at 305. Pakootas v. Teck
Cominico Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1077 (9th Cir. 2006), holds that the presumption
against the extraterritorial application of statutes does not apply to hazardous substance
releases which come to rest and cause harm in the United States. See John H. Knox, The
Boundary Waters Treaty: Still Ahead of Its Time, 54 WAYNE L. REv. 1591 (2008).
However, NGOs continue to argue that the IJC has jurisdiction outside of the reference
procedure. A 2006 submission to the Commission of Environmental Cooperation (CEC),
created by the NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement, illustrates the power of one
nation to block IJC action. See Determination in Accordance with Article 14(1) of the
North American Agreement for Environmental Cooperation, SEM 06-002/04/14(1), June
8,2006, at 1 [hereinafter Determination]. For decades Canada has been concerned with
the release of polluted water in Devil's Lake, North Dakota into Canada. Id. at 2.
Manitoba asked the Canadian federal government to refer the issue to the IJC, but the
Bush Administration refused to do so. See, e.g., Oxford Analytica, U.S.-Canada Water
Disputes Appear Likely to Keep Flowing, available at http://thehill.com/op-eds/u.s.canada-water-disputes-appear-likely-to-keep-flowing-2007-1 0-17.html (last visited Feb.
8, 2009). After this decision, a group of United States NGOs filed a CEC submission
which asserted that Canada and the United States have failed to enforce the Boundary
Waters Treaty by refusing to refer the alleged cross-border pollution from Devil's Lake,
North Dakota to the IJC. Determination, supra, at 1. The submission was dismissed
because of the considerable legal uncertainty as to whether the Treaty was a law or
regulation in either Canada or the United States as Article 14 of the Side Agreement
requires.Id. at 3. For an NGO perspective on the submission, see Wright, supra note 3.
23. Lemarquand, supra note 2 at 75-76.
24. Noah D. Hall, Bilateral Breakdown: U.S.-Canada Pollution Disputes, 21 NAT.
REs. &ENV. 18, 19 (2006).
25. Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 2-3.
26. Joseph W. Dellapenna, International Law's Lessonsfor the Law ofthe Lakes, 40
U. MICH. J. L. REFORM, 747, 754-57 (2007).
27. Map of Lake Michigan, available at http://encarta.rnsn.com/map_70l513942/michigan_lake.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2009).
28. Richard B. Bilder, Controlling Great Lakes Pollution: A Study in United StatesCanadian Cooperation, 70 MICH. L. REv. 469 (1970).
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In short, the Treaty is not structured to deal with political rather than
actual diversion problems.
The basin states thus decided to address the problem themselves in
close cooperation with the provinces of Ontario and Quebec. They
produced a domestic agreement which has two significant international
law aspects and one domestic law aspect. 29 First, it was the exclusive
product of joint negotiations among the eight basin states and the
provinces of Ontario and Quebec. 30 Orthodox constitutional law teaches
that the federal government not the states can conduct foreign policy. 31
In practice, Canadian provinces and American states have a long
history of sub-treaty agreements. 32 The Compact is a particularly
interesting example of sub-constitutional foreign affairs initiatives by
states and their foreign federal counterparts that occurred due to informal
national government sanction. The Compact comes close to a bi-national
treaty because Ontario and Quebec adopted parallel legislation. 33 From
the Canadian perspective, the arrangement avoids the constitutional
issues that would arise, if the federal government were to try and force
the provinces to comply with the environmental obligations of the
treaty.34 It also avoided recognizing any formal attempt on the part of
29. Compact, supra note 7.

30. /d.
31. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10. (''No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation ....").
32. See generally MICHAEL BYERS, THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
(2000).
33. See generally Dellapenna, supra note 26.
34. PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 254-56 (2nd ed. 1985). The
relationship between the federal government and Canadian provinces is complicated
because Canada has long been a part of the British Empire. Id. Canada did not have the
power to enter into treaties until Great Britain delegated this power in the 1919 Treaty of
Versailles, which ended World War I. Id. The delegation of authority was confirmed in
the Statute of Westminster of 1931 and again in 1947. Letters Patent to the Office of
Governor General of Canada, R.S.C. 1970, app. II No. 35. However, treaties are not part
of domestic law and thus binding on Canadian provinces in contrast to United States law.
U.S. CONST. art. VI. The diplomatic practice in Canada is to involve the provinces
directly in treaty negotiations because provincial implementation of legislation is often
necessary. HOGG, supra at 254-56. Provinces, led by Quebec, have gone beyond this
practice and have asserted the right to make treaties. Id. This power cannot be found in
past Canadian constitutional law when it was part of the North American British Empire
or in post-1982 law after Westminster relinquished any vestiges of authority over
Canada. Id. The federal government strongly asserts the "ultimate prerogative to enter
into" international agreements. George Anderson, Canadian Federalism and Foreign
Policy, 27 CAN.-U.S. L. J. 45, 51 (2001). The Boundary Waters Treaty avoids this
problem because it in an Empire Treaty, which is binding on the provinces under the
Constitution Act of 1867. Constitution Act, 1867,30 & 31 Vict. ch. 3 (U.K), as reprinted
in R.S.C., No. 5 (app. 1985, 132) [hereinafter Constitution Act]. The balance of
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Quebec to act as a sovereign nation. 35 From the United States'
perspective, it preserved the myth that the federal government defers to
state water allocation law. 36
The second interesting aspect is that the Compact adopts, with little
fanfare, directly and indirectly several contested key principles of
international environmental law such as precaution and the recognition
that the Lakes are a common heritage of humankind. 37 Third, given the
crucial national and international significance of the Great Lakes, it is
striking that the United States federal government played almost no role
in the Compact;38 it did not even send a federal representative to the
Compact processes as it has done when an interstate compact is being
negotiated to allocate a river in order to pave the way for federally
subsidized dams. 39
The HC played an important role in the Compact process in two
crucial ways. First, it addressed some of the difficult legal questions that
provincial versus federal foreign affairs capacity nonetheless remains open in Canada
because in addition to the long transition from being part of the British Empire to
becoming an independent nation, the country has a strong federal system in which the
provinces have considerable exclusive authority especially with respect to natural
resources. See Email from Noah Hall, infra note 87. Provinces might refuse to comply
with a non-Empire international treaty signed by the federal government if the treaty
deals with water allocation, including the allocation for environmental values as the
Compact does. Id. The three maritime provinces and the province of Canada (now
divided into Ontario and Quebec) formed modem Canada in 1867. HOGG, supra at 25456. The Constitution Act of 1867 gives the provinces exclusive authority to public land
management and property, which is understood to include water. Constitution Act, supra,
at section 92. Section 91 reserves to the federal government the residual power to
legislate for "Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada," but the scope of this
power as it relates to water has not been tested. Id. at section 91; see also P.H. PEARSE, F.
BERTRAND & J. W. MAcLAREN, CURRENTS OF CHANGE: FINAL REpORT INQUIRY ON
FEDERAL WATER POllCY 61-84 (1985) (discussing the precarious balance between federal
and provincial authority over water allocation and management).
35. HOGG, supra note 34, at 254-56.
36. The "myth" has its roots in California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland
Cement Co., which held that three nineteenth century public lands statutes severed water
from the public domain and gave the states exclusive authority to choose a legal system
to allocate western waters. 295 U.S. 142, 154-55 (1935). The federal government has
always exercised power over waters through the commerce, property and treaty powers,
and environmental statutes such as the Clean Water Act and Endangered Species Act
which can preempt state law. See Reed D. Benson, Deflating the Deference 1I1yth:
National Interests vs. State Authority Under Federal Laws Affecting Water Use, 2006
UTAH L. REv. 241 (2006).
37. I have addressed this aspect of the Compact in A. Dan Tarlock, The Great Lakes
as an Environmental Heritage of Humankind: An International Law Perspective, 40 U.
MICH. 1. L. REFORM 995 (2007).
38. See generally id.
39.Id.
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were hindering the negotiations. Second, the IJC helped make a sciencebased case for the anti-diversion regime in face of arguments that
"locking up" the Lakes was economically irrational, unnecessary and that
a conventional division of the waters among the states would be a
superior response. 40 This Article advances the modest thesis that the
IJC's role is a case study in how international treaty organizations can
overcome the limitations that are inherent in a body controlled by a
limited number of sovereigns. International bodies which are willing to
take the risk of taking a strong stand on an issue can help international
environmental norms to evolve through their incorporation into domestic
legal regimes and can adapt these regimes to changed circumstances not
contemplated in the treaty.
II. BARRIERS TO THE NEGOTIATION OF THE COMPACT
To understand the niche that the IJC found to influence the Compact
process, it is necessary to understand the barriers that threatened to block
any agreement. The Compact faced two sets of barriers. The first were
the conventional disincentives that often prevent interstate cooperation in
sharing a contested water resource. The second were a set of legal and
scientific issues that were unique to the Great Lakes. On the plus side,
most of the present uses of the lake are non-consumptive. It is easier to
agree on the balance among non-consumptive as opposed to consumptive
uses. 41
Since the 1920s, interstate compacts have been hailed as the best
way to share interstate resources, but water compacts are hard to
negotiate. 42 The riparian states must either be convinced that an
allocation regime is superior to the status quo or that at least some of
them cannot maintain the status quo in face of proposed uses by other
states. 43 For example, in 1922, the seven Colorado River basin states
allocated the Colorado River between the Upper and Lower basins to
40. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Strange Career of the Dormant Commerce Clause and
International Trade Law in the Great Lakes Anti-Diversion Regime, 2006 MICH. ST. L.
REv. 1375, 1379 (2006).
41. B. Timonthy Heinmiller, The Boundary Waters Treaty and Canada-U.S.
Relations in Abundance and Scarcity, 54 WAYNEL. REv. 1499,1524 (2008).
42. See, e.g., Josh Clemons, Interstate Water Disputes: A Road Map for States,
available at http://www.olemiss.edu/orgs/SGLCIMS-AL/acf.htm (last visited Apr. 6,
2009). Jerome C. Muys, George William Sherk & Marilyn O'Leary, Utton
Transboundary Center Model Interstate Compact, 77 NAT. REs. 1. 17,25 (2007). But see
Charles 1. Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REv. I, 45-48 (1966) (stating that
Congressional apportionment is superior to a compact).
43. Robert H. Abrams, The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 as a Model for
. Interjurisdictional Water Governance, 54 WAYNEL. REv. 1635, 1645 (2008).
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prevent fast-growing southern California from claiming the whole flow
of the river under the doctrine of prior appropriation. 44 Often states balk
because a compact will make them worse off because they must decrease
their water use. For example, this fear has blocked the negotiation of an
allocation of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Tallapoosa watershed
among Alabama, Florida, and Georgia. 45 Georgia argued that its
upstream position had the most to lose from any agreement that requires
minimum flows downstream for navigation enhancement and aquatic
ecosystem protection. 46
The situation in the Great Lakes was different. Because serious
diversions are hypothetical, the problem of dividing a limited resource
among competing interests did not exist.47 Since the value of the
Compact was primarily symbolic,48 .each state stood to gain politically by
blocking future moves by "others" outside the region. Instead of the
usual problems, the Great Lakes states faced three somewhat unique
barriers, one political and scientific and the other two legal.
A. Thin Political and Scientific Justification

The first problem was that the Compact appeared geopolitically,
constitutionally and hydrologically unfair, inefficient, irrational, and
unnecessary. Quite simply, the goal of the basin states and provinces was
to lock up twenty percent of the world's fresh water supplies almost
exclusively for non-consumptive uses. 49 The numbers get worse because
the Great Lakes account for ninety-five percent of the United States'

44. See Colorado River Compact of 1922, available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/pao/pdfiles/crcompct.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2009).
45. See, e.g., DAVE FELDMAN, WATER POLICY FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, 140
(2007).

46.Id.
47. See KEN CONCA, GoVERNING WATER: CONTENTIOUS 'TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS
AND GLOBAL INSTITUTION BUILDING 73-80 (2006) (discussing the stresses that many river
basins face and the barriers they pose to cooperative management among riparian states).
48. The Compact does impose two real costs on the basin states. First, the straddling
communities' standard may block many small transfers across the basin line. Second, the
Compact will create pressure for the additional regulation of surface and groundwater.
States such as Indiana, Illinois, Ohio, New York, and Pennsylvania have resisted the
strong regulated riparianism adopted in Minnesota, Michigan, and Wisconsin. The
Compact was briefly held up when an Ohio state representative argued that it would
erode Ohio's power to control its water resources. Michael Scott, Great Lakes Water
Compact Weighs on Region's Future, THE PLAIN DEALER (Apr. 6, 2008), available at
http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2008/04/greaUakes_water_compact_weig.html
(last
visited Apr. 6, 2009).
49. See Compact, supra note 7, § 4a.
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surface supplies50 but only ten percent of the population lives in the
basin. 51 Given the shift of population to the more arid areas of the
country,52 one can legitimately ask: what is the rationale for this action,
especially since all the diversion threats were and are, speculative at best
and highly unlikely to come to fruition for environmental and economic
reasons?53
During the negotiations two rationales to overcome these problems
emerged, but they lacked a coherent scientific basis. First, the eight basin
states argued that their political power would continue to decrease as the
region fell behind most of the country in population growth. 54 Thus, it
was a case of striking while the iron was hot, especially because there
was no serious opposition in Congress or the rest of the country to the
Compact.55
The second rationale came from Canada. Many Canadians were (and
remain) deeply convinced that eventually "their" water would flow south
and west. 56 In 2007, Dr. Frank Quinn, a leading Canadian expert on
water policy, surveyed the shift in the United States to water
conservation and demand management and the gap between the
perceptions of the Canadian public and the historic tendency of the
Canadian federal government not to rule all diversions off the table in the
name of good relations with the "elephant" to the south.57 Admitting that
there was no present or immediately foreseeable diversion proposal on
the table, he nonetheless concluded that "[s]hould the US find itself in
desperate need for water in the future . . . what would prevent the US
50. See Great Lakes Facts and Figures, available at http://www.greatlakes.net/lakes/ref/lakefact.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2009).
51. See Dale R. Olen, Great Lakes Compact Needs Wisconsin's Approval Now,
available at http://www.jsonline.com/news/opinion/29477969.html (last visited Apr. 6,
2009).
52. See, e.g., U.S. 2000 Census Finds Record Growth, available at
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/04/02/us.census/index.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2009).
53. During the 1980s, I once raised this issue with Donna Wise, the President of the
Center for the Great Lakes and was informed that I was right but ultimately wrong
because politicians in the region thought that diversions were a problem and, thus, they
were a problem.
54. See, e.g., Tim Jones, Fate a/Great Lakes' Water Looking Fluid, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
28, 2007 at A-30.
55. Statements of Sam Speck (on file with author).
56. See. e.g., Tim Morris, Great Lakes Agreement Could Spring Leak, THE STAR
(Apr. 10, 2007), available at http://www.thestar.com/artic1e/201141 (last visited Apr. 6,
2009).
57. See Frank Quinn, Water Diversion, Export and Canada-US Relations: A Brief
History, Program on Water Issues, Munk Centre for International Studies, available at
http://www.powi.ca/pdfs/events/powi20070910_12pm_Water_Diversion.pdf (last visited
Apr. 6, 2009).
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from simply taking a disproportionate share of waters along the
international boundary, specifically ... the Great Lakes?,,58 This said,
while assuaging Canadian angst may be laudable, it is not a complete
rationale for putting the lakes off limits to the rest of the United States.
B. A Violation ofthe Judicial Common Market?

The lock-up strategy was not only scientifically and economically
suspect, but it was a presumptive violation of the Dormant Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution.59 The Compact solves this
issue; a compact becomes federal law with Congressional approval and is
an exercise of Congress' power to waive the Dormant Commerce
Clause. 6o However, the issue was very alive during the 1980s and 1990s.
State resource export bans have long been struck down on the theory that
no state can hoard its resources to the detriment of other states. 61 A 1982
United States Supreme Court decision, Sporhase v. Nebraska,62 caused
great concern on both sides of the border and cast a chill on the soft law
regime that preceded the Compact and on its negotiation.
Sporhase was a farmer whose farm straddled the Colorado-Nebraska
border. 63 When Colorado's strict groundwater conservation regime
blocked access to groundwater on the Colorado portion of his land, he
proposed to pump the water from the Nebraska portion and ~se it in
Colorado. 64 In contrast to Colorado, Nebraska at the time followed a
modified version of the common law on groundwater use, which gave
overlying landowners the right to pump water with few restrictions. 65
State law even allowed exports, but only if the host state had reciprocal
58. Id. at 5. In January 2008, the distinguished United States environmental advocate
and activist, Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., warned Canada that it must resist pressure to sell its
water to the United States to avoid "an environmental catastrophe" in Canada. Nick Lees,
Canada Urged Not to Share Water with Americans, THE EDMONTON JOURNAL (Jan. 18,
2008), available at http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2008/01118/6460 (last visited
Apr. 6, 2009).
59. See Tarlock, supra note 40, at 1379; U.S. CONST. art. I, §8.
60. New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982). Congress did
this twice in 1986: 42 U.S.C. § 1926d-20 (2009) and Water Resources Development Act
of2000, Pub. L. No. 106-541, § 504, 114 Stat. 2572 (2000).
61. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 596-98 (1923) (holding
that although natural gas supplies in West Virginia were waning, the state was not
entitled to favor its interests over those of other states, as the natural gas constituted a
"lawful article of commerce").
62. 458 U.S. 941.
63. Id. at 944.
64. /d.
65.Id.
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rights to withdraw water for use in Nebraska,66 which Colorado law did
not have. 67 The Supreme Court held that the farmer was entitled to his
water because "water is an article of commerce" subject to the Dormant
Commerce Clause. 68
Nebraska defended its statute on the state's long recognized power,
to control the allocation of resources within its borders; captured· in the
phrase "state ownership," to control the allocation. 69 Though the state
ownership defense was accepted by Justice Holmes in 1908,70 the Court
rejected that argument and labeled state ownership as a fiction that has
always been subject to the Commerce Clause. 71 Sporhase was read for
the principle that all export bans are presumptively unconstitutional, a
reading reinforced by the Court's aggressive use of the Dormant
Commerce Clause to invalidate protectionist environmentallegislation. 72
The case left a host of questions unanswered. For example, should a
regional-international agreement be treated differently from a unilateral
export ban?73 The reach of Sporhase was important because between
1985 and the beginning of Annex 2001, the Compact negotiation period,
the states tried to control diversions under the soft, non-binding Great
Lakes Charter, which was reinforced by Congressional legislation which
allowed state export bans.74

66.Id.
67. Id. at 957.
68. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 960.
69. Id. at 951.
70. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
71. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 951.
72. See, e.g., Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 339-40 (1992) (''No
State may attempt to isolate itself from a problem common to the several States by
raising barriers to the free flow of interstate trade."); Or. Waste Systems, Inc. v. Or. Dept.
Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994) (declaring unconstitutional Oregon's excessive
surcharge on hazardous waste imported from other states). This line of cases has been
widely criticized as an unwarranted interference with the power of the states to regulate.
Liza Heinzerling, The Commercial Constitution, 1995 SUP. CT. REv. 217 (1995). Justices
Scalia and Thomas believed that the doctrine had no basis in the Constitution and was an
unjustified intrusion on state regulatory power. See id. at 233. Nonetheless, the Court has
created only limited exceptions for environmental regulation. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S.
131 (1986) (holding a ban on non-native "baitfish" is constitutional because the state
demonstrated that the ban was necessary in light of uncertainty as to the effects of the
possible presence of parasites and nonnative species having on the state's fisheries).
However, the case opens up the possibility of a broader ecosystem protection defense.
73. I have addressed these and related issues in Tarlock, supra note 40.
74. If Sporhase were not enough, a prominent western water lawyer hired by the
Great Lakes Governors caused a stir when he concluded that the Water Resource
Development Act of 1986 (WRDA) was an unconstitutional delegation of power because
it had no standard. ANNIN, supra note 11, at 198-202.
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C. International Trade Law
In addition to the Dormant Commerce Clause, a second common
market problem arose. "Canadian Nationalist Greens, among others,
raised the argument that a Canadian export ban [which was ultimately
adopted by the federal parliament], was illegal under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) because it discriminated
against non-Canadians desiring to export water.,,75 A similar argument
was made under NAFTA,76 These arguments were stoked by the
Lockheed Report, which recommended that the best way to avoid all the
constitutional problems with the Charter-WRDA regime was to enter
into an interstate compact that gave each state a share of the lakes to use
as it saw fit. 77 The recommendation was the opposite of what the Lakes
and most NGOs were seeking. Canadians seized on the recommendation
as an attempt to perpetrate the ultimate water evil: "commodify" the
resource. 78 However, commodification fears can be found in the United
States. For example, in 2005 the Governor of Michigan ordered state
officials to block a proposal by Nestle to withdraw spring water for
bottled water sales unless Nestle could prove that the bottles would be
sold exclusively within the basin.79
III. ENTER THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION
The IJC was able to influence Compact negotiations by leveraging
the reference process. The Treaty allows the IJC to investigate issues
referred to it by the two governments. 80 Once the two nations agree to
Tarlock, supra note 40, at 1378.
North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S. Dec. 8-17, 1992, 32
289 (1993); see also Tarlock, supra note 40, at 1393.
ANNIN, supra note 11, at 199.
78. See MAUDE BARLOW, BLUE GoLD: THE FIGHT TO STOP THE CORPORATE THEFT OF
THE WORLD'S WATER (New Press, 2002).
79. See PETER LUKE, GREAT LAKES STATES CIRCLE THE WAGONS ON FRESH WATER
(2006). This incredible anti-commodity argument was made in litigation challenging
Perrier's planned diversion of spring waters in Michigan. Mich. Citizens for Water
Conservation v. Nestle Waters N. Am., Inc., Case No. 01-14563-CE (Mich. 9th Judicial
Cir. 2003), aff'd on other grounds, 709 N.W.2d 174 (Mich. App. 2005), rev'd on
standing grounds, 269 Mich. App. 25,479 N.W.2d 280 (2007). Earlier opponents of the
proposed extraction argued that when groundwater was used to produce commodities, the
commodities could only be consumed on the overlying land. Id. The trial court rejected
the argument because the reasonable use adopted by Michigan only requires that the
water be applied on overlying land. Id.
80. Treaty, supra note 1, § 4. In theory, either country could submit a reference but
the BC's consistent practice has been to act only when both countries agree to refer an
issue to it. See generally id.
75.
76.
I.L.M.
77.
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refer a matter to the Commission, it can investigate the issue, holding
public hearings on the basin and issue a report. 81 State practice has made
the reference process the Commission's most important function and the
major source of its political influence. This level of influence is due to
the custom of joint Canada-United States requests, which create "at least
an implied obligation on both of them to deal with the report in a
responsive way.,,82 Reference reports have often laid the foundation for
Canada-United States cooperation on major issues or at least provided a
broad, relatively neutral analysis of issues superior to studies subject to
the immediate pressures of national politics.83
In 1999, the two governments agreed to an UC reference. The
resulting 2000 report, Protection of the Waters of the Great Lakes: Final
Report to the Governments of Canada and the United States (Report),84
helped overcome the three barriers to the Compact, especially the fIrst
and third. The reference came at the right moment in time. The Report
was the last example of the positive role that the Commission played
during the Clinton administration in helping to shape the policy debate
about the future of the Great Lakes' in regards to environmental issues.
Both the Canadian and United States Commissioners had a strong
commitment to the conservation of the lakes 85 and both the Canadian and
United States sections were led by accomplished water professionals at
home in both the· technical and policy world. 86 In addition, there was an
overlap between the key state players and the UC. 87

81. Id.
82. The Right Honorable Herb Gray, Session 8: Canada and U.S. Approaches to
Health Care: How the Canadian and U.S. Political, Regulatory, and Legal Systems
Impact Health Care, 31 CAN.-U.S. L. J. 287, 290 (2005).
83. Lemarquand, supra note 2.
84. Water Uses Reference, Final Report, available at http://www.ijc.org/php/publications/htm1lfinalreport.htm1 (last visited Apr. 6, 2009).
85. Email from Noah. D. Hall, infra note 87.
86. After 2000, the IJC's role was diminished by the Bush Administration's
unilateralism, the relative decline in Canadian-United States relations and the strong
United States commitment not to fetter state resource control with federal or international
preemption. Oxford Analytica, supra note 22; see supra note 22 for a discussion of the
Devil's Lake drainage conflict. The low point in the United States section came in July of
2007 when President George W. Bush fired the United States section co-chair, Dennis L.
Schornack, a longtime, respected Michigan water manager. See, e.g., David Bauermaster,
Firing by Bush Rejected By Boundary Official, SEATTLE TIMES (July 12, 2007), available
at http://seattletimes.nw-source.com/html/localnews/2003785546_border12m.html (last
visited Apr. 6, 2009). Mr. Schornack's position also included the chairmanship of the
Canada-United States Boundary Commission. Id. The Treaty requires a ten-foot open
space on both sides of the border, and Mr. Schornack ordered the removal of all walls in
the state of Washington that violated the ten-foot requirement. Id. After the property
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This said, the IJC concluded, after considerable internal debate, that
a state-provincial effort was the best avenue to protect the Lakes. 88 There
was concern that if it did not, the United States federal government might
instead preempt state efforts, as it had the full constitutional power to do,
and the dedication of the lakes to regional uses might be subordinated to
the possibility of national (arid) western use of the Lakes. 89 Pursuant to
the reference, the IJC prepared a report, which examined both the
scientific and legal issues raised by the diversion threats. 90 It marshaled
available scientific research to underscore the need for a strong antidiversion regime.

A. A Rationale/or Leaving Twenty Percent a/the World's Fresh Water
in Place
The Report blended a synthesis of the available science of the Lake's
hydrology with the emerging,· and much contested, international
environmental law precautionary principle in order to counsel that the
Great Lakes states and Canadian provinces were a strong anti-diversion
regime. 91 The foundation of this conclusion is the Report's mixed
owner complained to a powerful, local Republican official, sufficient pressure was
generated to fire him for the sin of disrespecting private property rights. Id.
87. Dennis L. Schornack, who was appointed to the IJC by President George W. Bush
and subsequently fired. See supra note 86. Mr. Schornack was Michigan Governor John
Engler's primary policy advisor and one of the original architects of Annex 2001. See
Dennis L. Schornack, Chairman, United States Section, available at
http://rosenberg.ucanr.org/bios/Schornack%20bio%2006.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2009).
He was replaced on the Commission by Dr. Sam Speck, who was the Ohio Department of
Natural Resources Director under former Governor Taft. See Tom Henry, Ohian May
Join Water Panel, President Bush Intends to Pick Ex-ODNR Director, THE BLADE (Dec.
available
at
http://www.toledoblade.com/apps/pbcs.dlVarticle21,
2007),
?A1D=/20071221/NEWS0617l2210352 (last visited Apr. 6, 2009). Dr. Speck was
selected to chair the Council of Great Lakes Governors Water Management Working
Group that oversaw the Compact's development and negotiation. Id. Professor Noah D.
Hall reports that
[m]ost people who saw the process up close would agree that Schornack was
one of the most significant political leaders for Annex 2001, and Speck was
definitely the main political leader on the compact through at least 2006. So
while the IJC as an institution did not oversee the compact process, its
overlapping political leadership has.
E-mail from Noah D. Hall, Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School (Dec.
14,2008 14:29 CST) (on file with author).
88. Telephone Interview with Gerald Galloway, Secretary, United States Section, IJC
1998-2003, (Sept. 16,2008).
89.Id.
90. Report, supra note 84.
91. Id.
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scientific economic classification of the lakes as a fragile, fully allocated
"nonrenewable resource.,,92 This idea is a surprising and counterintuitive
conclusion, given that the Great Lakes are currently used almost
exclusively for non-consumptive uses. 93
Nonrenewable resources are usually deep aquifers and mineral
deposits rather than rain fed water bodies. 94 Rivers and lakes are classic
renewable resources and the conservation objectives and strategies are
different. 95 With non-renewable resources, the issue is the optimum rate
of mining. 96 With renewable water resources, the trick is balance
consumptive uses with minimum flow demands constrained by estimates
of average dependable supplies. 97 Nonetheless, the Lakes have a
fundamental non-renewable characteristic, a long renewal time, that
makes them analogous to a deep aquifer. 98 As the Report noted, less than
one percent of the their total volume is renewed annually by precipitation
and the levels remain relatively constant "with a normal fluctuation
ranging from thirty to sixty cm (twelve-twenty-four inches) in a single
year." 99
The· line between a renewable and non-renewable resource is a
matter of judgment, and the classification of the Lakes as fully allocated
is a normative conclusion, which the Report was careful to underscore. 100
An allocation of a river or lake can refer either to a situation where
recognized property rights exceed the available dependable supply or to
the dedication of a resource to a suite of uses to the exclusion of others.
The latter, which is the case in the Great Lakes, is an economic or
normative choice rather than a hydrologically constrained situation. As
the IJC recognized, an existing resource use mix can always be
changed. IOI The IJC determined that the question is, what opportunity
costs would be incurred by any change from the current allocation?

92. Id. at 5.
93. ANNIN, supra note 11, at 18. (stating that only 1.5% of the renewable supply is
consumed).
94. See, e.g., Ground Water Resources: The Sociotechnological Aspects of
Nonrenewable Ground Water Resources, available at http://ngwa.confex.com/ngwa/renew08/techprogramlMEETING.HTM (last visited Apr. 6, 2009).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. !d.
98. See Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement Review Environmental Community
Discussion Paper (June 2006), available at http://www.canamglass.org/glwqa/files/AgrmntRev EnvirCmmtyDiscPaperfmal.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2009).
99. Report, supra note 84, at 6.
100. Id.
101. Conversation with Galloway (on file with author).
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The observation that there would be opportunity costs just from any
change in the status quo is not a compelling argument for the
maintenance of the status quo. There were many suggestions that more
consumptive uses should be allowed, because instead of costs there
would be benefits from changing the status quO. 102 Those familiar with
the law of prior appropriation in the Western United States suggested
that the states enter into a compact which would make a conventional
allocation among the riparian states so they could then use the water as
they wished. 103 Some proposed a compact which would give each state a
share. Others urged an allocation, but in a bow to the value of nonconsumptive uses recommended that it be constrained by a cap and trade
program borrowed from the climate change debate. Thus, the Report had
to take an additional step and provide a more convincing rationale for not
incurring the opportunity costs of increased diversions and rejecting the
lure of profitable interstate and international water markets.
The Report took this step by concluding that not only are the Lakes a
non-renewable resource, but that they are a fragile one and thus change
would involve risks. 104 This is another non-intuitive conclusion to
anyone who has seen the Lakes on a stormy, windy day or remembers
the concern about shoreline erosion and flooding in the mid-1980s.105
The basis of the fragility is the fact that lake levels fluctuate based on
precipitation and evaporation cycles and even small seasonal fluctuations
can have dramatic and costly consequences for the ecosystem and the
maintenance of the primary commercial, non-consumptive use of the
Lakes navigation. 106 Lake shippers, owners of pleasure boat launching
facilities, and shore land property owners have lived with short and long
term fluctuating levels for years. lO? For example, in the mid-1980s, the
Lakes were high and the Be studied ways to increase the flow to the
Saint Lawrence River. 108 However, since the mid 1980s, Lake levels
have remained low; the current low period is perhaps the longest on

102. See Dick Lehnert, Great Lakes Water Compact Still Spurns Controversy,
available at http://www.fruitgrowersnews.com/pages/arts.php?ns=791 (last visited Apr.
6,2009).
103. See discussion, supra note 72.
104. Report, supra note 84, at 5.
105. See A. Dan Tarlock, How Well Can International Water Allocation Regimes
Adapt to Global Climate Change?, 15 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 423 (2000).
106. !d.
107.Id.
108.Id.
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record; although it is impossible to predict the incident and amplitude of
future cycles. 109
Natural level cycles have been altered over time by human
intervention, such as diversions. 110 Chicago's diversion to reserve the
flow of the Chicago River is the largest. 111 The outflow from Lakes
Superior and Ontario have been regulated by locks and dams, but only
ll2
Lake Ontario's levels are significantly altered by the regulation. Sand
and gravel dredging have also affected lake levels. 113 However,
compared to other large drainage systems, the Lakes are still a
substantially unregulated system. 114 Still, the evidence shows that
diversions and other forms of regulation and diversion have not had a
significant impact on seasonable variations levels makes the case for
controlling speculative, future diversions weak.
The case strengthens if the prospect of global climate change is
factored into the mix. The Report concluded that the Lakes are "highly
sensitive to climatic variability."ll5 It synthesized the various projected,
but inconsistent, climate change scenarios to reach the bold conclusion
that "[c]limate change suggests that some lowering of water levels is
likely to occur . . . [and] the Commission believes that considerable
caution should be exercised with respect to any factors potentially
reducing water levels and outfloWS.,,116
The precautionary principle is an evolving international
environmental law norm. ll7 It can be stated in hard and soft: versions, 118
109. See Human Impacts on and Responses to Great Lakes Water Levels: Low Lake
Levels, available at http://sitemaker.umich.edu/sec005group3/low_lake_levels (last
visited Apr. 6, 2009).
110. Id.
111. See Brendan O'Shaughnessy, Indiana Towns Shut Out While Chicago Suburbs
Flourish (Dec. 13, 2004), available at http://www.thetimesonline.com/articles/2004/12/13/news/top_newslbalbc3c2c7fce2be86256f690003b52c.txt (last visited Apr. 7,
2009).
112. Frank H. Quinn, Secular Changes in Great Lakes Water Level Seasonal Cycles,
28 GREAT LAKES REs. 451, 455 (2002).
lB. !d. at 452.
114. See Report, supra note 84.
115. Id. at 6.
116. Id. at 24-25.
117. See ULRICH BEYERLIN, DIFFERENT TYPES OF NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW, 425 (Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunee & Ellen Hay eds., 2007); Jonathan B. Weiner,
Whose Precaution After All? A Comment on the Comparison and Evolution of Risk
Regulatory Systems, 13 DUKE J. COMPo & INT'L L. 207 (2003) (exploring the legal status
ofprecaution).
118. The soft precautionary principle posits that a high degree of certainty about the
adverse impacts of an activity is not a necessary prerequisite to limit or regulate it and is
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but the core idea is that the state has the power to limit activities that
pose a risk of future harm when the available scientific evidence about
the likelihood and magnitude remains uncertain and inconclusive. 119 The
United States has opposed the precautionary principle as a European
import with the dangerous potential to undermine the more rigorous
scientific foundations of United States environmental 1aws. 120 However,
the principle has been endorsed by the World Trade Organization 121 and
is increasingly applied.
The application of the principle to the Compact can be criticized
because the probability and magnitude of the harm remain low, and the
Compact chooses the crudest policy instrument, a total prohibition of the
activity.122 However, the application can be defended because the
opportunity costs of precaution are low. As long as the Lakes remain
protected for non-consumptive uses, the exercise of precaution is a case
of picking "the low hanging fruit." More broadly, the Compact is an
important example of adoption of precaution in an international
agreement.
one of the foundations of international environmental law. Gregory N. Mandel & James
Thuo Gathii, Cost-Benefit Analysis Versus the Precautionary Principle: Beyond Cas~
Sunstein's Laws ofFear, 2006 U. ILL. L. REv. 1037, 1073 (2006). The hard version posits
that an activity should not be allowed until there is conclusive evidence that it does not
cause hann. The general principle was endorsed in the 1992 Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development. See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
prine. 15, U.N. Doc Al Coni 151/5/Rev.l (June 14, 1992), reprinted in 31 LL.M. 874
(1992). Because crucial issues such as who bears the burden of proof and how feedback
loops should operate remain unresolved, it remains much contested and has been
criticized as incoherent and unfair. See, e.g., CASS SUNSTEIN, THE LAW OF FEAR: BEYOND
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005); Christopher D. Stone, Is There a Precautionary
Principle?, 31 ENVTL. L. REp. 10790, 10792 (2001); Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils
ofthe Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 851 (1996).
119. Mandel & Gathii, supra note 118, at 1073.
120. The best articulation of this position is found in Weiner, supra note 117; see also
Jutta Brunnee, The United States and International Environmental Law: Living With an
Elephant, 15 EUR. 1. INT'L L. 617, 628-30 (2004) (discussing United States opposition in
the broader context of the fear of general principles of customary law).
121. E. U v. United States (WTO) is one of the fullest considerations of the principle.
Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing
ofBiotech Products, WT/DS 291, 292, 293/R/Corr. 1 (Oct. 10,2006). The Panel decision
rejected the EU's formulation which would have allowed any doubt, regardless of the
scientific foundation, to justify a regulatory action, in this case a ban on GMOs. The EU
argued that certain GMOs present potential threats to human health and the
environment. It submitted that the existence of a potential threat justified the assessment
of risks on a case-by-case basis and special measures of protection based on the
precautionary principle.
122. Sunstein suggests that the principle should be used when the magnitude of the
hann is great and that prohibition should never be considered the only appropriate policy
instrument. Sunstein, supra note 118, at 119-20
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B. International Trade Law

One of the persistent issues running through the Compact
negotiations and debates was the fear that any regulatory regime which
allowed any diversions would be found to be a violation of either
NAFTA or GATT. 123 The argument is both a series of hard, unresolved
legal issues and political theater and continues to be raised. 124 Since the
late 1990s, environmental NGOs, especially Canadian nationalist Greens,
have claimed that either the Dormant Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution or international trade law might preempt all state and
provincial control of diversions. 125 The basic argument was that any
regime that allowed regulated diversions was therefore a
"commodification" of the Lakes and could then be challenged as a
disguised discriminatory trade practice. 126
The argument makes three crucial, but doubtful, assumptions. First,
it assumes that raw water is a "good" which triggers trade law. Second, it
assumes that a nation-to-nation case would ever reach the WTO or
NAFTA. Third, it assumes that there are no trade law defences to the
anti-diversion policy. 127
123. Tarlock, supra note 40, at 1378.
124. Dellapenna, supra note 26, at 788-90.
125. See Scott S. Slater, State Water Resource Administration in the Free Trade
Agreement Era: As Strong as Ever, 53 WAYNE L. REv. 649, 650-51 (2007) (presenting a
collection of the most important sources for this argument).
126. See J. Owen Saunders, Trade Agreements and Environmental Sovereignty: Case
Studies From Canada, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1171 (1995); Sanford E. Gaines, Fresh
Water: Environment or Trade?, 28 CAN.-U.S. L. 1. 157 (2002).
127. In addition to the lack ofa threshold trigger, the Basin states have several possible
trade law defenses. The WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) excepts science-based standards "only to the
extent necessary to protect human, animal, plant life, or health ...." See David G. Victor,
The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement of the World Trade Organization: An
Assessment After Five Years, 32 N.Y.U. 1. INT'L L. & POL. 865 (2000); Sanford E. Gaines,
Processes and Production Methods: How To Produce Sound Policy for Environmental
PPM-based Trade Measures, 27 COLUM. 1. ENVTL. L. 383 (2002). More to the point,
Article XX provides an exception for a variety of domestic regulations including the
protection of human health and the conservation of exhaustible resources. United StatesImport Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, APPELLATE BODY REpORT,
WTIDS58/ABIR, paras. 119-120 (Nov. 6, 1998), reprinted in 38 LL.M. 121 (1999)
[hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle]. It also has a chapeau, which prohibits the application of
exempted regulation in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner. Invoking both defenses
would not be easy. The close cooperation between the two nations provides a basis to
argue that this is not the kind of decision that requires WTO policing. WTO
jurisprudence has evolved from an effort to isolate protectionist regulation to one which
is willing to find that the failure of a nation to fmd alternative, cooperative means to
achieve the regulatory objective constitutes trade discrimination. SUNGJOON CHO, FREE
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GATT and NAFTA prohibit national discrimination against the
importation of goods similar to those produced (and protected)
nationally.128 Thus, there is a threshold question: does the activity in
question involve a produced good? GATT Article ill allows
environmental regulations which treat "foreign" goods differently from
domestic ones to be challenged as illegal. A "victim" state can argue that
such regulation is a disguised trade restriction, which confers an
unjustified competitive advantage on domestic products at the expense of
imported ones. National treatment is intended to curb blatant
protectionism and performs the same function internationally as the
Dormant Commerce Clause does domestically.
The threshold legal issue is whether water in its natural state is a
product or good AND at what stage does the use of water become a
good? Answers are only clear at either end of the cycle of water use.
Raw water in its natural state in a lake or river has not entered the stream
of commerce. 129 It remains subject to the control of the sovereign country
constrained only by any transboundary sharing duties. Further, there is
no principle of trade law that forces a nation to engage in trade. Trade
law only requires equal treatment of nationals and foreigners once the
decision to trade is made. At the other end, once water is incorporated
into a product, such as bottled water, it becomes subject to trade law. The
gray areas involve diversions, storage and management decisions. 130
MARKETS AND SOCIAL REGULATION: A REFORM AGENDA OF THE GLOBAL TRADING
SYSTEM 17- 90 (2003) (tracing this evolution). In addition, the HC Report offers a partial
justification for invoking the prevention of exhaustion of nomenewable resources
defense.
128. See sources cited, supra note 127.
129. In 1993, the three NAFTA governments issued a statement which asserts
"[u]nless water, in any form, has entered into commerce and become a good or product, it
is not covered by the provisions of any trade agreement including ... NAFTA." The
Water Case Study, available at http://www.american.edu/ted/water.htm (last visited Apr.
6,2009).
130. NAFTA Chapter 11, Section 1110 prohibits regulatory measures that are
"tantamount to nationalization or expropriation" of "investments." The North American
Free Trade Agreement: Chapter 11, available at http://dsp-psd.tpsgc.gc.ca/CollectionRlLoPBdP/inbrief/prb0254-e.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2009). There is no NAFTA or
WTO precedent on these issues. A Canadian-United States joint venture proposed to
transport water from the Fraser River in British Columbia to California by tanker, but
British Columbia imposed an export ban. In 1998, the United States company filed a
Chapter 11 request for an arbitration, but its website, Sun Belt Water, Inc., contains no
post-1998 information about the action. See Sun Belt Water-NAFTA-Bulk Water
Transport, available at http://www.sunbeltwater.com/(last visited Apr. 6, 2009). Given
that a water right is usufructuary in all three countries, Chapter 11 should only be
triggered after a country grants a right to export water and then claws it back. Prior to that
time, the nation retains the sovereign right to decide what water rights, if any, it will
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In the run up to the Compact, the fate of the resource improvement
standard illustrated the political force of this argument. The Lockheed
Report recommended that the states apply a standard from section 404 of
the Clean Water Act to the Lakes. 13l Section 404 regulates the dredging
and filling of wetlands. 132 In 1989, the first Bush Administration adopted
a "no net loss" standard. 133 To accommodate this ambitious goal with
land development, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers can authorize the
destruction of "natural" wetlands if compensating degraded ones are
restored or artificial ones are developed. 134
Under most drafts of the Compact, a diversion would have been
allowed if there was a compensating resource improvement in the
basin. 135 Many environmental organizations were comfortable with the
idea of allowing small diversions in return for significant wetland
restoration or similar projects. 136 However, in the end, Canadian
objections appear to have forced its remova1. 137 Allowing a diversion to
be traded off against a restored aquatic ecosystem was characterized as
commodification.
There is no definitive legal precedent to resolution of this issue, but
the Report played a significant role in dampening the legal and political
force of the trade law objections to the Compact. It helped to strengthen
the resolve of the eight Basin states and two Canadian provinces to
proceed with a management regime and not to be spooked by the trade
law invalidation horror scenarios floating through the basin. The Report
identified the key legal issue as whether water in its natural state is a
product or good for purposes of trade law and concluded that raw water
that has not yet entered the stream of commerce is not a product or good.
This conclusion was, of course, purely advisory, and the IJC has no
special competence to pronounce on international trade law. But,
subsequent analyses have confirmed the IJC's conclusion. A leading
international environmental law lawyer, Edith Brown-Weiss,
subsequently offered a powerful argument to support the conclusion:
recognize. See Paul Stanton Kibef, Grasp on Water: A Natural Resource That Eludes
NAFTA 's Notion a/Investment, 34 ECOLOGY L. Q. 655 (2007).
131. ANNIN, supra note 11, at 202-10.
132. 33 U.S.C. § 1294-1281 (1977).
133. See, e.g., Bush Administration Proposes to Weaken vital Clean Water Act
Permitting Program, EARTHJUSTICE, available at http://www.earthjustice.org/news/press/001/bush_administration.Jlroposes_to_weaken_vital_clean_water_act.Jlermitting_
program.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2009).
134. See id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. /d.
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it is essential to consider that water is different from other
resources. It is a unique resource.... Thus, it would be prudent
to adopt an approach of "anticipatory caution" to strike the
appropriate balance between the need to conserve water
resources and the need to ensure a level playing field in trade
relationships. Anticipatory caution means that in the face of
uncertainty about the future, a country should be able to exercise
its full sovereignty to maintain its fresh water resources without
having to convince the trade community of the legitimacy of its
actions. 138
IV. CONCLUSION: A MOMENT IN TIME
This Article previously observed that the diversion reference was a
moment in time. All the forces were in alignment for a successful
outcome. The two section Secretaries saw eye-to-eye as to the vision and
willingness to take political risks by taking a firm position on a
contentious issue; the six commissioners were supportive and generally
deferred to the staff. The two governments were in agreement, or at least
the United States was indifferent so long as the Great Basin states
supported it and there was no serious section opposition. Of course, the
IJC Report was by no means responsible for the successful negotiation of
the Compact. But, the negotiators were operating in uncharted waters and
the threat of trade law challenges had to be taken seriously. The Report
helped to provide a coherent scientific case for the first time and to
"internationalize" the Compact by placing it in the context of emerging
international law norms. These two contributions strengthened the
legitimacy of a somewhat questionable enterprise. The result is a model
of aquatic ecosystem protection, imperfect as it, which is being carefully
studied around the world. And, the IJC's indirect role in this process is
an example of how a treaty body can interpret its mandate broadly in
light of the spirit of the treaty, and not just the inevitable narrower
language of the instrument. 139
The 100th anniversary of the Boundary Water Treaty celebrates
another moment in time but one which is still very much with us. The
first decade of the twentieth century was the birth of modernism, and in
areas from culture to political institutions we are still living in that
138. EDITH BROWN WEISS, WATER TRANSFERS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, IN
FRESH WATER AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 61, 83 (2005); Slater, supra note 125
reaches the same conclusion; but see Milos Barutciski, Trade Regulation ofFresh Water
Exports: The Phantom Menace Revisited, 28 CAN.-U.S. L. J. 145,155-56 (2002).
139. Knox, supra note 22, at 1591.
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legacy. Canada and the United States experienced the decade differently,
but the Treaty reflects a central experience in each country. In Canada,
the Laurier government established Canada's independent authority to
conduct international relations;14o the Treaty reflects Canada's new role
as an equal, almost independent sovereign. Across the border, President
Theodore Roosevelt (1900-1908), our fIrst self-consciously modem
president,141 led the scientifIc conservation movement. This movement
was founded on using the best scientifIc and technical knowledge to
manage natural resources to promote the public interest in their effIcient
use. Our notions of effIciency have changed, but the IJC's role in the
Compact honors the conservationist spirit of the Treaty as well as the
principle ofbi-national equality.

140. J. BARTLETBREBNER, CANADA: A MODERN HrSTORY, Ch. XXIV (1960).
141. EDMUND MORRIS, THEODORE REx (2002).

